

## **Ὅχεῖα, Mules, and Animal Husbandry in a *Prometheus* Play: Amending *LSJ* and Unemending Aeschylus fr. 189a R**

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ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὅχεῖα καὶ ταύρων γένος  
δοῦς ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα. (Fr. 189a R)

Bestowing—of horses and donkeys—the vehicles and the race of  
bulls as slaves and receivers of burdens.

Out of context, these two verses give the deceptive impression of being obvious and transparent, but their meaning has proved far more troublesome than appears at first. Some readers familiar with the lines already may have balked at this translation even if it is, in principle, warranted by the standard scholarly edition of the fragments of Aeschylus.<sup>1</sup> It is, in fact, the burden of this article to show that not only is this translation incorrect, but so is the emended text on which it rests.

Fortunately, for purposes of our comparison, these lines are quoted in three ancient literary sources, two by Plutarch and one by Porphyry, who quotes Plutarch. All three citations attribute this quotation to Aeschylus, but not to any particular play; scholars regard the lines as belonging to *Prometheus Unbound*.<sup>2</sup> The interpretation of the fragment is not a simple matter, and the crux is the correct meaning of the word ὅχεῖα in verse 1. First, ὅχεῖα is not the universally received reading; second, even the restored ὅχεῖα is not translated in the same

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<sup>1</sup>Radt 304, with detailed and full commentary; Nauck 1889: 65; and Mette 124. Fr. 189a R (above) is identical to fr. 194 N (cited by *LSJ* s.v. ὅχεῖον) and fr. 336 M, except that Radt follows Wilamowitz (74–75) in emending γονάς “offspring” to γένος “race.”

<sup>2</sup>This play follows *Prometheus Bound* in its trilogy; Herington 151, no. 511b. I make no claims about Aeschylean authorship, but do think of *Prometheus Bound* and *Prometheus Unbound* as by a single author; cf. below, n. 12.

way by all scholars; and third, the misunderstanding of the word apparently motivated Wilamowitz's further emendation of γονάς "offspring" to γένος "race" (printed by Radt above). At stake, once ὀχεῖα is established as the best reading, are the lexical meaning of ὀχεῖα, the right understanding of the fragment as a whole, and the poet's precise idea in the intertextual way that he expressed it through an overt and thoroughly integrated allusion to *Prometheus Bound*. To understand the fragment apart from its lost dramatic context requires patience and a broad argument that touches on popular lore and the nitty-gritty of animal husbandry in antiquity, in addition to literary and linguistic matters.

All three ancient citations come directly or indirectly from Plutarch, and all from passages treating different aspects of a single problem, namely, the right of humans to animal labor:

[a] Plu. *de Fort.* 3 (98c) with ὀχεῖα,<sup>3</sup>

[b] Plu. *de Soll. An.* 7 (964f) with ὀχεῖαν (quoted below, n. 25),<sup>4</sup> and

[c] Porph. *Abst.* 3.18.6 (= Plu. fr. 193.33–38 S) with ὀχεῖαν (quoted below, p. 78).<sup>5</sup>

The correct reading is easy to establish. Ὀχεῖαν "mounting, mating" violates the iambic trimeter by making the alpha long where a short syllable is required in the second foot of the second metron; it can be emended right away to ὀχεῖα in [b] and [c], based on the reading in [a], but this is only a first step. More problematic is the fact that ὀχεῖα also has been rendered in four distinctly

<sup>3</sup>In the middle of a short essay on luck (τύχη), Plutarch discusses how the senses are a consequence of nature, not luck, and how mind (νοῦς) distinguishes human beings from wild animals (θηρία). He identifies Prometheus with the process of reasoned thought (λογισμός), and this power of mind gives humans legitimate control over animals as illustrated in the fragment attributed to Aeschylus.

<sup>4</sup>In a dialogue on the degree of intelligence that animals have, the speaker, Aristobulus, argues that a maxim exists which allows animals (τὰ ζῷα) to share in reason, yet preserves the justice (τὸ δίκαιον) of those persons who use them in appropriate ways, including "domesticating gentle and friendly (φιλόνηρωπα) animals and making them helpers (συνεργά) in the service (χρεῖα) for which they each exist by nature." Plutarch quotes Aeschylus to illustrate this idea, but all the codices of *de Soll. An.* read ὀχεῖαν (Hubert 26 *ap. crit.*).

<sup>5</sup>Porphyry seeks to "show that animals are rational, and that in most of them reason (λόγος) is imperfect but not wholly absent" (3.18.1). It is the elaboration of the central point raised in [b], but here Porphyry lifts and adapts a passage from an unknown work by Plutarch, whom he names at the outset (3.18.3–20.6 = Plu. fr. 193 S). Just as in [b] above, the codices give τε ὀχεῖαν, which has been emended by Reiske to τ' ὀχεῖα, based on the reading in [a]: see Nauck 1886: 208 *ap. crit.*, and cf. fr. 193 S. By contrast, Bouffartigue and Patillon 173 *ap. crit.* give τε ὀχεῖαν [*sic*].

different ways as *coitus* (“copulations, mountings”), *vectiones* (“vehicles, wagons”), “stallions,” and “offspring,” and my purpose is to decide which meaning is correct. Radt’s concern about translating ὀχεῖα perhaps explains why he followed Wilamowitz 74–75 and emended to γένος where Nauck and Mette print the reading of the codices, γονάς. Wilamowitz’s conjecture is only incidental to the present argument but, as will be shown, this emendation simply is not necessary.

### I. “Coitus”

Not much space need be given to this particular rendering of the word. In 1663, Thomas Stanley (643 col. 2) tried to save the sense of ὀχεῖαν as “mounting, mating” by translating ὀχεῖα with the plural *coitus*, now echoed by Clark (2000: 90–91), “matings.” But it is hard to deduce this meaning from the neuter plural ὀχεῖα, and Stanley’s idea was rejected a century later, in 1762, by Benjamin Heath (161 col. 1), who said, “...de coitu hic nequaquam agi constat ex versu sequente.” This dismissal is abrupt but just. The same kind of arguments against taking “stallions” as πόνων ἐκδέκτορα tell against this translation too. In brief, the matings themselves can be neither “the receivers/inheritors of [human] labors” nor “like slaves” (ἀντίδουλα). Of course, Stanley may have intended *coitus* figuratively (as Clark takes “matings”), the act of mounting standing for its results, that is, the mature offspring in this case, and not simply the foals *qua* foals.<sup>6</sup> But his notes do not say so, and even this metonymic sense would be unnecessarily obscure and misleading in the face of the forceful and explicit second verse.

### II. “Vectiones”

Radt also quotes Heath (*ibid.*) to revive his translation of ὀχεῖα as “vectiones” (cf. ὀχήματα “chariot, carriage”): “Verte, *Equorum asinorumque vectiones & taurorum prolem*, boves scilicet....” Ὀχεῖον “vehicle, wagon” is attested, on Harpocration’s say-so, at least as far back as Dinarchus (fr. 71.3 C), who is the

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<sup>6</sup>This would have gone further than Aristotle did when he used ὀχεῖα synonymously with ὄχευμα “embryo”: cf. (a) ...ἐὰν μὲν ἵππος ἀναβῇ ἐπὶ ὠχευμένην ὑπὸ ὄνου, οὐ διαφθείρει τὴν τοῦ ὄνου ὀχεῖαν, ὁ δ’ ὄνος ἐὰν ἐπαναβῇ, διαφθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἵππου διὰ ψυχρότητα τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος (“...if a stallion covers a female already mounted by a jack, he does not destroy the ὀχεῖα of the jack, but if the jack covers her second, he destroys the ὀχεῖα of the stallion’s seed (σπέρμα) because his own is cold,” GA 748a33–35), and (b) ὁ μὲν οὖν ὄνος ἐπαναβάς διαφθείρει τὸ τοῦ ἵππου ὄχευμα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται (“Therefore, if a jack mounts [a mare] second, he destroys the embryo (ὄχευμα) from the stallion, exactly as previously stated,” HA 577a26). Both ὀχεῖα and ὄχευμα here mark successful matings.

last of the canonical ten Attic orators (late fourth century). Radt characterizes Heath's solution as "optime iam," but in fact it is not satisfactory. There are four obstacles which, taken together, undermine this proposal.

First, this meaning of ὀχεῖον only confuses the issue, and thus it has been ignored by all the translators of Plutarch and Porphyry cited in this paper, as well as by Lloyd-Jones and Griffith (1983).<sup>7</sup> The sole recorded instance of this meaning *may* apply only to a horse-drawn chariot, and not to a work-wagon at all. Dinarchus' context is unclear, but his usage is assigned to a speech περὶ τοῦ ἵππου ("On the Horse"). "Horses were not required for heavy work, which was carried out by oxen, donkeys and mules—animals that require much less fodder" (Isager and Skydsgaard 86). It is sometimes said that "...the ancient harness made the horse unsuitable for dragging heavy loads" (Isager and Skydsgaard 85–86), but "in fact, if equine harness in antiquity was really inefficient, practical experimental and technological studies prove that the princip[al] cause was not the system of harnessing" (Spruytte 15).<sup>8</sup> The fact that horses need more fodder certainly restricts their utility for long-distance draft work; to a certain extent, so does the fact that neither the Hellenes nor the Romans developed extensive use of harnessing in file, although this second limitation applies to all harness animals. Some horses were used in draft work, with old nags laboring in mills and the like, but the main reason why horses in their prime were not used regularly for draft work is the overall expense of maintaining them and their consequent function as status symbols for the wealthy (below, n. 22).

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<sup>7</sup>In addition, the fragment alludes to *Pr.* 462–65 (quoted and discussed in the next section of this paper), and Heath's sense of ὀχεῖα as "vectiones" may be forcing a further parallel with the nearby ὀχήματα (*Pr.* 467–68): θαλασσόλαγκτα δ' οὔτις ἄλλος ἄντ' ἐμοῦ / λινόπερ' ἦρε ναυτίλων ὀχήματα ("No one else but I invented the sailor's sheet-winged chariots built to rove the sea").

<sup>8</sup>Isager and Skydsgaard make broad reference to the work of Lefèvre des Noëttes, but his results have been challenged seriously by Spruytte's experiments. On the harness, see also Vigneron 51–79. Pomeroy *et al.* 3 give the modern *communis opinio* about draft animals: "Oxen (castrated bulls) or mules...were necessary for plowing and for drawing heavy loads. A farmer without ready access to a yoke of oxen or a pair of mules would be classified as poor.... Horses were the primary markers of high social status: beautiful creatures, very expensive to maintain, and useful only for riding and for pulling light chariots." On horses, see also Isager and Skydsgaard 85–89 and Burford 1993: 72–74. On donkeys, below, n. 36. Burford 1960 *passim* corrects Lefèvre des Noëttes about the relative unimportance of the ox; and see White 57–69 on the discovery of horse-power (esp. 59–61).

Second, there appears to be some question of whether Heath's gloss *boves* means "cattle" or "oxen."<sup>9</sup> But if the inclusive "cattle" were intended, the πόννοι "burdens" involved would include at least some πόννοι that are more metaphorical in relation to human labors than the passage allows. So, if *boves* means "oxen" (and at first sight Heath's *proles* does look more like γονάς "offspring" than γένος "race"), then γονάς can stand, and Heath himself both expressed no reservations and printed the received text.

Third comes the problem of what it means to be πόνων ἐκδέκτορα ("receivers/inheritors of burdens").<sup>10</sup> The meanings of γονάς and ὀχεῖα are tied closely together,<sup>11</sup> but it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to understand "wagons" (if it is to fit both horses and donkeys) as being, even by hypallage, "like slaves" and "receivers/inheritors of πόννοι" when these phrases also apply literally to the "progeny of bulls" in the very same occurrence. Nor does Wilamowitz's emendation of γονάς to γένος avoid this pitfall. He does not say whether ὀχεῖα means "wagons" or "stallions" (the latter is discussed in the next section). But "the race of bulls" (ταύρων γένος) and wagons are not πόνων ἐκδέκτορα in an equivalent sense, and so even with Wilamowitz's emendation ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὀχεῖα is reduced by metonymy to a phrase meaning simply "horses and donkeys." Difficulty is not a reason to reject poetic complexity, of course, but all three ancient citations assume that the meaning of these verses is obvious and transparent even when they are quoted in isolation.

Fourth, and most important from a literary point of view, to understand ὀχεῖα as "wagons" also causes the fragment to break the parallelism with the passage in *Prometheus Bound* that it deliberately alludes to and otherwise resembles. Without this parallel, however, the allusion is destroyed and the comparison defeated.

In the present state of the scholarship, and whether or not the verses of the fragment were written by Aeschylus, they ought to be by the same author who

<sup>9</sup>*Boves* in Latin may mean "oxen," "bulls," "cows," or simply "cattle." No one has ever suggested that Heath meant "cows," nor is there any reason to suggest it now. If "bulls" were meant, then *tauri* would have been the unambiguous gloss. In English, "ox" can designate any member of the genus *Bos*. But "ox" is most familiar in the meaning of an adult castrated male bovine, used for draft-work or food; that is the sense that I use throughout.

<sup>10</sup>The main entry in *LSJ* s.v. ἐκδέκτωρ will not allow the neuter plural required here, but see the 1968 or 1996 *Supplement*.

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Radt 304 who, in justifying the emendation, observes, "quae corruptio e falsa lectione ὀχεῖαν vel e falsa interpretatione vocis ὀχεῖα...orta esse videtur"; and so, the interpretation of the fragment as a whole is at issue.

penned *Prometheus Bound*.<sup>12</sup> The words of the fragment give every appearance of being spoken by Prometheus, as passage [b] from Plutarch asserts, perhaps to inform the new chorus of Titans about his past deeds, since the fragment alludes to the list of benefactions he enumerated in the earlier play. The fragmentary verses sometimes are said to echo *Pr.* 462–66, but close examination shows that the parallel stops at γένονθ', the first word in line 465, as Thomas Magister, the so-called B-scholiast (known to Stanley), indicated ca. C.E. 1300:<sup>13</sup>

κἄρ' ἐν πρώτῳ ἐν ζυγοῖσι κνώδαλα  
 ζεύγλῃσι δουλεύοντα σάγμασιν θ' ὅπως  
 θνητοῖς μεγίστων διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων  
 γένονθ', ὅφ' ἄρ' ἔμαρ' ἤγαγον φιληνίους  
 ἵππους, ἄγαλμα τῆς ὑπερπλοῦθους χλιδῆς. 465

I was first to yoke ravening beasts in yokes,  
 so that, by being slaves to yoke-collars and pack-saddles,  
 they could become, for mortals, successors to their greatest toils,  
 and I brought to the chariot rein-loving horses,  
 a glory of opulent luxury.

In this passage there are a number of interpretative difficulties, which Martin West intended to ameliorate by printing Pauw's conjecture of σάγμασιν "pack-saddles" for σώμασιν "bodies" in line 463.<sup>14</sup> West is by no means the first to do so, and the conjecture now is accepted widely and is almost certainly correct. Harris Rackham, however, balked at it, because he thought line 462 referred strictly to draft animals, and not to pack-animals (Rackham 62 *ad* 479 =

<sup>12</sup>Griffith 1977: 252: "For the moment, we can only conclude that, although the balance of probabilities continues to favour the traditional theory of a Prometheus-trilogy, the alternative (two separate plays by different authors) cannot wholly be discounted." Griffith does not regard Aeschylus as author of *Prometheus Bound*.

<sup>13</sup>Griffith 1983: 304 says *Pr.* 462–66 (esp. δουλεύοντα ~ ἀντίδουλα, διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων ~ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα), but Stanley 861 col. 2 knew that the parallel—like Griffith's examples, we may add—ended at the beginning of line 465. Griffith also takes ὀχεῖα in *LSJ*'s sense: "horse- and ass-stallions, and bulls' offspring."

<sup>14</sup>Griffith 1983: 170 *ad* 463–65 justifies σάγμασιν and summarizes the difficulties of the received text. Emendation is inescapable. Δουλεύοντα is used proleptically if it governs the two datives; but if σώμασιν were retained it would strain the syntax by being proleptic and requiring the participial clause to parallel the ὅπως clause. This strain could be lessened, but not eliminated, if δουλεύοντα were emended to δουλεύσοντα. Likewise, Hermann's suggestion that σώμασιν means "bodies (of riders)," hence "riders," will not work since the animals mentioned in line 463 are ὑποζύγια, not mounts but draft animals and beasts of burden *serving as such*.

463), but Plu. *Pomp.* 40.4 shows that it is proper to speak of pack-animals as being “under [that is, ‘subject to’] the yoke,” τὰ σάγματα τῶν ὑποζυγίων, whether or not Plutarch’s ὑποζύγια means “beasts of burden” generally or simply “donkeys,” as it often does in Hellenistic and later times.

For the classical period, however, Xenophon gives the rule-of-thumb definition of ὑποζύγια (“oxen, mules,<sup>15</sup> horses”): καὶ [οἶδα] ὑποζυγία γε καλούμενα πάντα ὁμοίως, βοῦς, ἡμιόνους, ἵππους (“and [I know] that oxen, mules, horses are all alike called yoke-animals,” *Oec.* 18.4). Two terms need clarification at once, ὑποζύγιον “yoke-animal” and βόες “oxen.” A ζυγόν “yoke” is a wooden device that joins together a pair of draft animals at the neck and allows them to pull a plow, wagon, or chariot in unison and, so as to accommodate different animals and different ends, there is more than one type of ζυγόν. Strength, lightness, and mobility are at a premium in yokes for racing-cars and war-chariots, but strength, sturdiness, and constraint for plows or transport wagons. As shown by Plutarch’s usage described above (*Pomp.* 40.4), τὰ ὑποζύγια applies to animals that *could* serve in a ζυγόν, whether or not they actually do. Next, βόες, which could also mean “bulls” or “cows” or simply “cattle,” is understood correctly as “oxen” in this passage,<sup>16</sup> since oxen

<sup>15</sup>Except in this note, I use “mule” in the sense of ἡμίονος, which includes, in English, both “mule” (mare-and-jack cross) and “hinny” (Lat. *hinny*, Grk. ἵννος, stallion-and-jenny [jennet] cross). Since Roman times (cf. Col. 6.37.3–5), mules, being stronger and more vigorous, were bred more frequently than hinnies almost for as long as good work animals were a fact of daily life, and their larger size is linked to the size of the dam, which limits foetus size. Hellenic practice in this regard is not known (Isager and Skjdsgaard 87). Xenophon (*Eq.* 5.8) makes a passing remark on breeding mules, not hinnies, but not much can be read into it. Nor are Aristotle’s ruminations helpful on this point (*GA* 747a20–48b30, *HA passim*). Mosino 94 assumes—preposterously—that “non risulta noto ad essi (sc. Greci) il bardotto”; and even if (at least for the sake of argument) we accept his emendation of Aesop 285 H-H (= 128 C), his peripheral argument suggests only that for racing purposes true mules were preferred to hinnies (probably justifiable because of their somewhat greater size and strength), and possibly that, in racing, female mules were preferred to males (presumably because the females are somewhat more tractable); but mules were not employed primarily in racing.

<sup>16</sup>Above, n. 9 on the term “ox.” Bulls are excluded, but cows were used for plowing, though not typically: “few estates in Attica maintained more than plow oxen in the way of cattle” (Burford 1993: 148; cf. Isager and Skynsgaard 89). All translations of βόες preserve some degree of the word’s multiplicity. Thus, “oxen” occurs in Pomeroy 191 and Marchant 497; “Rinder” in Audring 105 and Meyer 73; “bueyes” in Zaragoza 277–78; “boeufs” in Chantraine 1949: 101 with his n. 4 (“Le paysan emploie surtout mulet et le boeuf; le cheval est un animal de luxe [cf. II, 6]”).

were the basic and preferred form of power.<sup>17</sup> Bulls are not used in the yoke, but often enough, as in Homeric society, cows are (cf. Hom. *Od.* 3.382–83), although the extent and exact nature of this practice in ancient Hellas is unclear. “Hard labour...diminishes the fertility of cows considerably, and it is probably safe to assume that most draught-animals were bullocks [sc. oxen]” (Isager and Skynsgaard 89).<sup>18</sup>

In *Oeconomicus* 18.4, Xenophon does not distinguish horses as a conspicuously separate subclass from oxen and mules, as the author of *Prometheus Bound* does, because the operation of threshing, which is being described in Xenophon’s larger context, merely required walking the animal over the area and did not routinely require heavy pulling or dragging.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Xenophon does indicate elsewhere that their costliness sets horses apart from mules and oxen. Just as *Prometheus Bound* notes that horses are a “glory of opulent luxury,” so Xenophon notes the distinctive luxuriousness of horse-keeping, ἵπποτροφία (generic plural),<sup>20</sup> because it made the owner liable to heavy expenditures imposed by the state (*Oec.* 2.6). To sum up, “horses were very expensive,” and “...not useful, except to a certain extent in war” (Burford 1993: 72).

*Prometheus Bound* 462–66 already had made explicit the same broad division of ὑποζύγια that is only implicit in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*. The passage distinguishes between two different groups of ὑποζύγια: (1)

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<sup>17</sup>Burford 1960 argues that this preference is related, in part, to the harness, but see above, n. 8. About plowing, Burford 1993: 126 observes: “Mules were recognized as effective draft animals, but oxen were generally regarded as the most suitable form of power.” She cites Hom. *Il.* 10.351–53, and we may add, with Isager and Skynsgaard 89, that “we have seen representations of mules as a plough-team, but the ox is shown more often.”

<sup>18</sup>Occasional work in the yoke need not be strenuous, as threshing in modern Chios shows: see Clutton-Brock 155, fig. 11.1 (using yoked cows).

<sup>19</sup>Only the action of the animals’ hooves is required (*Oec.* 18.4–6). Pomeroy 332 elaborates: “Driving draught-animals over the ears of grain was the most common method of threshing in antiquity. Their hooves alone could do the job, but some farmers also used threshing sledges.” See preceding note.

<sup>20</sup>Most often ἵπποτροφία means “horse-keeping” rather than “horse-breeding”; cf. Burford 1993: 73 and 150–51. “The *breeding* of horses was more or less restricted to regions with abundant pasture of the right kind; *keeping* one cavalry horse was probably as much as most horse owners in Attica could manage” (151).



μεγίστων διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων “successors to the greatest toils,”<sup>21</sup> those routinely subjected to the draft-yoke or pack-saddle, that is, oxen and mules, and (2) horses, a sign of great wealth but not regularly employed in heavy dragging or carrying, and typically kept for military service, ceremonial display, and racing-cars.<sup>22</sup> And so, if ὀχεῖα in the fragment means “wagons,” then this implicit similarity with Xenophon breaks down but, more importantly, the allusion in the fragment to *Prometheus Bound* also fails, because it significantly distorts the description of the animals’ working gear and, with that, the typifying qualities of the animals being identified.

In *Prometheus Bound*, draft animals are “slaves to yoke-collars” (ζεῦγλῃσι δουλεύοντα), while horses are “rein-loving” (φιληνίους). In Ancient as in Modern Greek, the ζεῦγλαι are the ropes looped through the ζυγόν to form the collars. There are two ζεῦγλαι per yoke and, unlike the reins, they are not strictly part of the harness. The rudimentary yoke of the draft animals is both distinctive and oppressive, and no doubt more restrictive than the one ordinarily used on horses. For draft animals, the yoke is the sign of their enslavement: “the ox is the poor man’s slave (οἰκέτης)” (Arist. *Pol.* 1252b11–12);<sup>23</sup> at the same time, the reins of the horse both are welcome to the animal and also mark what is imagined as its willing cooperation and greater sociability.<sup>24</sup> In the fragment, then, the meaning “wagons” would erase this important difference between the two groups of animals under discussion—

<sup>21</sup>Μοχθήματα (= πόννοι) is used only here by Aeschylus. See also *Pr.* 1027, where Hermes describes Prometheus’ savior as διάδοχος τῶν σῶν πόνων, “successor to your burdens,” and so διάδοχος μοχθημάτων ~ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα.

<sup>22</sup>The use of horses and chariots to display wealth is most familiar from Pindar’s odes (e.g., *O.* 1, 2... etc.), the opening of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (1–85), and Alcibiades’ bold display at Olympia (Thuc. 6.16).

<sup>23</sup>The power of this metaphor has genuinely Aeschylean parallels. Agamemnon uses the phrase “slave’s yoke” to describe Cassandra’s captivity (δουλίῳ ζυγῷ, *A.* 953), and Cassandra echoes it later (τὸ δούλιον ζυγόν, *A.* 1226). Clytemnestra also explores the image when she pictures the Trojans lamenting their dead “from a no longer free neck” (οὐκέτ’ ἐξ ἐλευθέρου δέρης, *A.* 328–29)—and who could forget that chorus’s haunting image of Agamemnon “putting on the yoke-strap of necessity” (ἀνάγκας ἔδω λέπαδνον, *A.* 218)? The λέπαδνον “yoke-strap” connects the yoke to the girth; it is different from the ζεῦγλαι but has the same synecdochic and symbolic value.

<sup>24</sup>These qualities, along with the dynamic beauty of the horse, have consequences for representational art. “The horse was the most decorative, and, as we shall see, the most socially acceptable animal to portray”: Burford 1960: 4. In her opinion, this imbalance renders the art useless as a gauge for the frequency with which horses were used.

unless ὀχεῖα is zeugmatic (!) and has two different significations, “chariots” with ἵππων, “wagons” with ὄνων, odd in a snatch cited for being transparent.

Moreover, even if this rhetorical yoking is possible, it would raise the status of donkeys as draft animals above the norm of practical wisdom, which prized oxen and mules in that capacity; it would also mean, as we shall see, that Porphyry, and Plutarch before him, did not understand the word correctly. In passage [b] above, “wagons” also breaks the flow of Plutarch’s thought and violates the grammatical pattern of the related examples, which are all noun phrases governed by participles and composed of words designating animals.<sup>25</sup> On balance, then, the meaning “vectiones, wagons” causes more difficulties than it resolves.

### III. “Stallions”

On the question of how to take ὀχεῖα in the fragment, *LSJ* is unambiguous: ὀχεῖον is a neuter noun defined as “male animal kept for breeding, stallion, Arist. *HA* 572a14, *GA* 748a27, *Str.* 16.2.10, *Plu. Lyc.* 15; cock, Arist. *GA* 730a11; ἵππων ὄνων τ’ ὀχεῖα A. *Fr.* 194.”<sup>26</sup> Chantraine and Frisk are in essential agreement.<sup>27</sup> In this sense, τὸ ὀχεῖον means any stallion animal, that is, any male animal used for breeding by mounting the female, whether or not he is kept exclusively for this purpose; the fragment in question applies this word only to horses and donkeys. The other passages cited support this definition; but,

<sup>25</sup>*De Soll.* 964f–965a: οὐ γὰρ ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ τὰ μὲν ἄμικτα καὶ βλαβερὰ κομιδῇ κολάζοντες καὶ ἀποκτινύοντες, τὰ δ’ ἡμεῖς καὶ φιλόανθρωπα ποιοῦμενοι τιθασὰ καὶ συνεργὰ χρεῖας, πρὸς ἣν ἕκαστον εὖ πέφυκεν, “ἵππων ὄνων τ’ ὀχεῖα καὶ ταύρων γονάς,” ὣν ὁ Αἰσχύλου (*fr.* 194) Προμηθεὺς “δοῦναι” φησὶν ἡμῖν “ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα” κυσὶ δὲ χρώμενοι προφυλάττουσιν, αἰγὰς τε καὶ οἷς ἀμελγομένας καὶ κειρομένας νέμοντες. (“In fact, they do not act unjustly—those individuals who punish and kill animals that are antisocial and just plain dangerous, while making the tame friendly ones our domestic helpers in work for which each is disposed by nature, namely, ‘the ὀχεῖα of horses and donkeys and the progeny of bulls’ which Aeschylus’s Prometheus said that he ‘gave’ to us ‘as slaves and relievers of our burdens’; and we use guard dogs and keep goats and sheep for milking and shearing.”)

<sup>26</sup>A second meaning (*LSJ* s.v. ὀχεῖον I.2), based on Harpocration (ἐν ᾧ ὀχεῖαι γίνονται κτηνῶν ἢ ὀχήματα μισθοῦται, “a place where cattle-breeding or vehicles are available for a fee”), simply needs to be pointed out here.

<sup>27</sup>Chantraine 1974: 843 s.v. ὀχεύω “mount (sexually), cover”: “ὀχεῖος ‘apte à la monte’ (Din.), -εῖον ‘étalon, mâle’ (Aesch., Arist.), également ‘lieu où se font les montes’ (Lycurg., *fr.* 26; selon Harp.).” Frisk 455 s.v. ὀχεύω: “Davon ὀχ-εῖος ‘zur Bedeckung dienend’ (Din.), -εῖον n. ‘Beschälungsplatz, Beschäler’ (Lykurg., Arist. usw.).”

if ὀχεῖα means “stallions” in the fragment, then three major hurdles need to be cleared, and they are not.

(1) **“Stallions” and “progeny of bulls.”** First, it is not intuitively obvious why the “sires<sup>28</sup> of [or ‘among’] horses and donkeys” should be paired on the page with the “progeny of bulls”; for, as breeding animals, both these stallions and the bulls—not the “progeny of bulls”—perform the identical function. This paradox merely appears to reinforce those who would emend γονάς to γένος, since the emended phrase ταύρων γένος (“race of bulls”) can be construed simply as “bulls,” thus achieving a parallel to ὀχεῖα “stallions,” but a proper understanding of the fragment obviates the need for this emendation. Second, both the “sires of [or ‘among’] horses and donkeys” and the “progeny of bulls” may be viewed as “slaves” or “like slaves” (ἀντίδουλα), but we miss the point if, as Porphyry insists, we think of stallions and breeding jacks as subdued and yoked, since their defining role as stallion animals has nothing to do with their being subdued and yoked. Third, work animals in their working capacity are intended, certainly by Porphyry, as will become clear in a moment. The “progeny of bulls” are oxen, then, and the parallel ἀντίδουλα ought to designate draft animals or beasts of burden or both.

(2) **The genitives.** This point cannot be decisive, especially in poetry, but if ὀχεῖα means “stallions” here, then the genitives it governs are different from and more ambiguous (explanatory, objective, or partitive) than the genitive with γονάς (source). This imbalance apparently also underlies Wilamowitz’s emendation of γονάς to γένος (printed by Radt), which is meant to bring the two object phrases into a mutually-reinforcing parallelism, as is illustrated by the Loeb translation of the emended fragment: “Giving to them stallions—horses and asses—and the race [γένος] of bulls to serve them as slaves and to relieve them of their toils” (Lloyd-Jones 450). By contrast, though, both Plutarch and Porphyry deploy the quotation attributed to Aeschylus as if the genitives create no particular ambiguity, and as if the full implication of the verses is transparent and immediate.

(3) **“Stallions” as “receivers/inheritors of burdens.”** In the most precise and detailed ancient interpretation of these verses, Porphyry—and probably Plutarch before him<sup>29</sup>—did not understand ὀχεῖα as “stallions” (Porph. *Abst.* 3.18.6):

<sup>28</sup>“Sires,” a virtual synonym in English for all quadrupedal “stallions,” conveniently and easily displays the ambiguity of the genitives with ὀχεῖα.

<sup>29</sup>Bouffartigue and Patillon 144–48 on Porphyry’s technique. Here he uses two back-to-back quotations from Plutarch but does not mark the switch: *Abst.* 3.18.3–20.6 (= Plu.

Ἄρκει γὰρ ὅτι μηδὲν πονεῖν δεομένοις χρώμεθα προκάμνουσι  
καὶ μοχθοῦσιν.

ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὀχεῖα καὶ ταύρων γονάς,

ὥς Αἰσχύλος φησὶν,

ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα

χειρωσάμενοι καὶ καταζεύξαντες.

For it is enough that we use the labor and toil of animals (although they have no need to work hard), as Aeschylus says, by subduing and yoking

ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὀχεῖα καὶ ταύρων γονάς  
ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα.<sup>30</sup>

In Porphyry's view, ὀχεῖα clearly implies an animal, and in a similar vein *LSJ* opt for the attested meaning of "stallions." The Budé editors of Porphyry's *de Abstinencia III* follow *LSJ* and take ὀχεῖα in their sense ("des chevaux de bât, des baudets...."), and yet the animals in question are said to relieve "our labors" ("qui prennent la relève de nos travaux").<sup>31</sup> The word being translated as "qui prennent la relève" is ἐκδέκτορα, but the underlying verbal idea is "to take or receive from another" (*LSJ* s.v. ἐκδέχομαι), that is, "to take on oneself." While horses and donkeys that breed may relieve the labors of humans through their offspring, they do not accomplish this end by being subdued and yoked themselves, as Porphyry requires when he both omits δοῦς "bestowing" and, to minimize misunderstanding, glosses it with the emphatic expression χειρωσάμενοι καὶ καταζεύξαντες ("having subdued and yoked them"), with the participles now pluralized to fit the prose construction.<sup>32</sup> That these animals are subdued and yoked is not only thematic but insistent; in this passage it is, for Porphyry, the single most important point of the quotation.

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fr. 193 S) and *Abst.* 3.20.7–24.5 (= *de Soll. An.* 3–5 [959e–963f]). The first gives a summary (3.19.1) of *de Soll. An.* 7, the chapter that contains passage [b] above.

<sup>30</sup>In passage [c], Porphyry's use of the Aeschylean quotation should approximate Plutarch's, even if it is not beyond Porphyry to change a word or two in Plutarch's larger context to support his own contention. The surrounding language also echoes *Pr.* 462–65: cf. μοχθοῦσιν and καταζεύξαντες. The latter's intensifying prefix (κατα-) recapitulates Aeschylus's burdensome (sic) polyptoton (καῖζευσά...ζυγοῖσι...ζεύγλησι).

<sup>31</sup>Bouffartigue and Patillon 173–74; likewise, Griffith 1983: 170 *ad* 463–65.

<sup>32</sup>Both participles can be construed with a word meaning "vehicles" or "wagons," but it would be just as hard for Porphyry, or Plutarch, to make the necessary and obvious point about animals if either took ὀχεῖα as "vehicles" or "wagons" in the fragment.

In their breeding capacity, then, “stallions” can function slavishly, but as stallions they cannot “receive” or “inherit” πόνοι (“labors, burdens”) from humans, unless both (a) copulation (ὀχεῖα “mounting, mating”)—the defining ἔργον (“function”) for which stallion animals are marked out and named—is a πόνος, as it well may be, and also (b) “our” πόνοι somehow include copulation with horses and donkeys—how else could these imagined “stallions” take on “our” πόνοι in this context? Heath had the good taste to mask this crude anomaly when he rejected Stanley’s *coitus*, but it needs to be articulated in the present instance if we are to avoid misconception. Stallions may be transmitters of these πόνοι, but in their capacity as stallions they do not accept or take “our” πόνοι *on themselves*. The “inheritors of (our) labors” are not the breeding animals as such, but their *working offspring*. As a translation of ὀχεῖα here, “stallions” can be discarded for the same reason that Heath correctly dismissed *coitus*, that is, it simply will not bear the interpretation of the second verse of the fragment.

#### IV. “Offspring”

Porphry’s context in passage [c] shows that animals are intended, but that the animals in question cannot be stallions. In the inference of “working offspring,” just noted, it is clear that ὀχεῖα, like γονάς, merely denotes “offspring” and that their capacity as work animals is deduced from the qualifying phrases, that is, from the correspondence between ἀντίδουλα and πόνων ἐκδέκτορα in the fragment and δουλεύοντα and διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων in *Pr.* 463–64. In Porphyry’s view, then, Prometheus gave humans their general right to animal labor “by yoking and subduing”

the *offspring* of horses and donkeys and the progeny (γονάς) of bulls  
as slaves that inherit (our)<sup>33</sup> labors. (Fr. 194 N; fr. 336 M)

Likewise, Plutarch also points to animals, but nothing he says suggests stallions either. Thus, passage [a] preserves the metrically correct ὀχεῖα and leads into Plutarch’s statement of specific differences, *at birth*, between humans and most animals: ἐπεὶ τύχη καὶ φύσει γενέσεως ἀμείνονι τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἀλόγων κέχρηται (“In fact, most animals are better off in luck and nature at birth,” *de Fort.* 2 [98D]). This transition is more natural if ὀχεῖα is roughly synonymous with γονάς, which is in parallel construction with it, and we have

<sup>33</sup>Porphyry requires “our,” but Prometheus’s point of view in the fragment, as in the earlier play (cf. *Pr.* 462–66), makes “their” correct. The πόνοι belong to humans, and since this possessive is merely implicit in the fragment, it is variable according to the quoter’s context.

already seen (p. 76) that in passage [b] Plutarch's language suggests that ὀχεῖα designates animals of some kind.

The translators of Plutarch and Porphyry fare better than the lexicographers in grasping the sense of ὀχεῖα. In 1823, in the first English translation of *de Abstergentia*, Thomas Taylor collapsed ὀχεῖα and γονάς into a single word, "progeny" (Taylor 96). Subsequently, two editors of Plutarch in the Loeb series translated it as "foal" (Babbitt 80) and "offspring" (Helmbold in Cherniss and Helmbold 352), and the Budé edition of *de Sollertia Animalium* gives "les petits" (Klaerr *et al.* 239). Only the Budé co-editors of Porphyry follow *LSJ* in taking this word as "stallions" (Bouffartigue and Patillon 173); otherwise "offspring" is the universal understanding among translators. We deduce, then, that the substantive, τὸ ὀχεῖον, must mean either "something derived from a (sexual) mounting" or, what comes to the same thing in a poetic context, "something descended from a stallion," since only "offspring of horses and donkeys" yields the needed sense, even though this meaning is not attested otherwise. If ὀχεῖα means "offspring," then the other interpretative difficulties in Porphyry also disappear: ὀχεῖα and γονάς are parallel in meaning, as in construction, thereby removing the need to emend γονάς; the interpretative ambiguity of the genitives is eliminated (ἵππων, ὄνων, and ταύρων are all genitives of source); and, most important, the second verse makes obvious literal sense both in its own right and in reference to *Pr.* 462–66.

The literary evidence goes this far, but linguistic questions remain about whether the neuter noun ὀχεῖον "offspring" can be derived morphologically and semantically and, if so, how a word for "offspring" and a word for "stallion" (still to be recognized) can both take the form ὀχεῖον. Fortunately, the morphology, semantics, and existence of the two homonyms all have parallels and can be explained on the basis of the following linguistic facts, as analyzed by Alan Nussbaum *per litteras*.

(1) The derivational suffix that appears in Attic as -ειο- comes from more than one source, but at least from both Proto-Greek \*-eh-ijo- (<\*-es-ijo-) and \*-ēh-ijo- (cf. Palmer 255).

(2) The latter group (as shown by trisyllabic Homeric and Ionic -ηιο- = -e-ijo-) are ultimately "genitival" adjectival derivatives of the -ēh- stems of the βασιλεύς type (cf. Palmer 250). For example (if we focus on what is relevant here, namely, the neuter substantive from such adjectives), κεραμεύς "potter" -> κεραμεῖον "[a] pottery, potter's workshop" (that is, \*keram-ēh- -> \*keram-ēh-ijo-) or γραφεύς "illustrator" -> γραφεῖον "pencil, chisel, brush."

(3) But these -εύς nouns also make—in most dialects—denominative verbs in -εύω (cf. Palmer 266): γραμματεύς -> γραμματεύω, ἵππεύς -> ἵππεύω,

κτλ. In the not infrequent case that a given -εύς noun makes both an -εῖον derivative and an -εύω verb (for example, κεραμεύς / κεραμεύω / κεραμεῖον), it might seem *synchronically* that the -εῖον substantive was the verbal noun of the -εύω verb (as if κεραμεύω “practice pottery” -> κεραμεῖον “[a] pottery, potter’s workshop”). Thus, any given -εύω verb—with or without an -εύς noun beside it—could make itself a (new) verbal noun in -εῖον.

(4) As a consequence, several different semantic types of verbal noun in -εῖον are possible: ἰατρεύω “treat” -> ἰατρεῖον “treatment, therapy” (verbal abstract); πρωτεύω “be first, hold first rank” -> πρωτεῖον “primacy” (verbal abstract); πορεύω “go, convey” -> πορεῖον “conveyance” (instrument < abstract); πυρεύω “kindle” -> πυρεῖον “kindling, fire stick” (instrument < abstract); καρπεύω “enjoy, profit from” -> καρπεῖον “fruit, profit” (abstract or “patient” [i.e., “thing enjoyed”]); ἱερεύω “consecrate” -> ἱερεῖον “victim” (patient); μεταλλεύω “mine” -> μεταλλεῖον “mineral” (patient or “result” [“that which comes from mining”]); πομπεύω “conduct in procession” -> πομπεῖον “(vessel) carried in procession” (patient); σκυτεύω “be a cobbler, cobble” -> σκυτεῖον “cobbler’s shop” (place < abstract); κυβεύω “gamble” -> κυβεῖον “gambling house” (place).

(5) Furthermore, a single given -εύω verb could even have a derived -εῖον that showed more than one of these semantic specializations. So, for example, μαντεύω “prophecy” -> μαντεῖον “thing prophesied” (patient), “prophecy” (result), “seat of an oracle” (place); πορθμεύω “ferry across” -> πορθμεῖον “crossing place” (place, obviously), “ferry boat” (instrument)—both understandable as abstract “ferriage”; ταμιεύω “store up” (*inter alia*) -> ταμιεῖον “treasury, storehouse”—both understandable as either abstract “storage” or result “store.”

We can now apply these data to our problem, since beside ὄχεϊον “stallion” and ὄχεϊον “offspring” there is ὄχεύω (cf. above, n. 27), which means—making the *LSJ* entry as explicit as possible—not only “mount (sexually), cover; copulate” but also (“said of the groom”) “mate a mare (with a sire); cause a mare to be covered (by a stallion).” These facts make it both tenable and attractive to suppose that ὄχεϊον “offspring” is simply a verbal noun of result derived from ὄχεύω “mount, cover.” As such, it can even be paralleled precisely by the semantics of a second verbal noun of result coming from the very same verb, since ὄχεύω “cover” also makes ὄχευμα “embryo” (Arist. *GA* 748a33). In this connection, it is also worth noting that Aristotle once glosses ὄχεϊα “mating” with ὄχευμα “embryo” (above, n. 6), as if the obsolescence of ὄχεϊον “offspring” might have caused conflation.

For ὄχεϊον “stallion,” then, a different semantic development of a verbal abstract in -εῖον is likely *prima facie*, since a neuter of this morphological type with this meaning would otherwise be somewhat difficult to explain. More specifically, ὄχεϊον “stallion” can be classified as a verbal noun of instrument in relation to ὀχεύω “cause a mare to be covered” and is thus “that by which one causes a mare to be covered,” much as πορεῖον “conveyance” (in relation to πορεύω) is “that by which one conveys.”

Thus, the translators of Plutarch and Porphyry are justified in taking ὄχεϊον as “offspring, foal,” even though this meaning is not attested directly elsewhere, and even though not one of them felt the need to explain it. The translators divide, however, on a second question, namely, whether two or three groups are being specified in the fragment. Some understand three groups: the ὄχεϊα of horses, the ὄχεϊα of donkeys, and the γοναί of bulls.<sup>34</sup> This view is shared necessarily by those who would take ὄχεϊα as “vectiones,” since horses and donkeys ordinarily pull different kinds of vehicles, and in normal circumstances no one would hitch these two species in the same yoke. Others exploit the parallelism and see only two groups, that is, the “ὄχεϊα of horses and donkeys” and the “γοναί of bulls.”<sup>35</sup> The latter idea preserves the shape of the original expression and should be preferred for structural reasons, and then at least one additional step is possible.

### V. Mules and Oxen

Virtually all farmers could use oxen and mules for dragging and carrying, but only the rich could keep horses because horses were expensive to purchase and maintain.<sup>36</sup> As a result, horses both provided a status symbol and sparked high feeling at Athens. Then, too, Hellas is a rough, uneven, mountainous country for which the mule is better suited (cf. the folk etymology of ὄρεύς “mule” from ὄρος “mountain,” which probably affected the aspiration of ὄρεύς < ὄρος “boundary”). In ancient times, horses were not much used there for heavy agricultural labor or transport,<sup>37</sup> but it is a commonplace—and common sense, based on the fact of hybrid vigor (heterosis)—that, because of their greater

<sup>34</sup>Taylor 96 and Bouffartigue and Patillon 173 think of three groups, as does Griffith 1983: 304.

<sup>35</sup>Babbitt 81, Cherniss and Helmbold 353, and Klaerr *et al.* 239 parallel the original language (hence two groups).

<sup>36</sup>So Pomeroy *et al.* (quoted above, n. 8). Cf. Pomeroy 332: “In addition to the animals listed by Ischomachus, donkeys might be employed by less wealthy farmers.” The mule was favored for overland transport, though donkeys, or even horses, might be used for small local jobs.

<sup>37</sup>Griffith 1983: 170–71 acknowledges the general point.



efficiency, mules were to be preferred to horses for heavy pulling, dragging, and carrying (cf. μοχθήματα, πόνοι). Donkeys and mules “have some characteristics that make them more useful than horses for certain purposes. Their sure-footedness makes them ideal pack animals for moving loads over rough areas. They are rugged and can endure strenuous work. In addition, they have the characteristic of taking care of themselves. For example, mules do not gorge themselves when given free access to grain; consequently, they do not normally founder from overeating. However, [donkeys and mules] do not respond to the wishes or commands of humans as well as horses” (Taylor and Bogart 481–82). As we have seen, in absolute terms, donkeys and mules also require much less fodder than horses (Isager and Skydsgaard 86). In general, heterosis “means that the hybrid is likely to be larger in body size, have greater endurance, and survive better on poor food than either of its parents” (Clutton-Brock 42). Thus, mules deal better than horses with the rough conditions and distress of heavy work in antiquity, which ordinarily would include hot weather, excessive demands, abusive treatment, and inferior or inexperienced drivers, as well as poor food and shelter.

The mention of donkeys in the fragment suggests that the work-capacity of the animals named in the genitive is not at issue since donkeys do not fall under the classical rule-of-thumb definition of ὑποζύγια, and since ὄνων is joined closely to ἵππων by syntax (τ') and horses should not be identified for their work-capacity. If, as seems obvious now, the “Ὀχεῖα of horses and donkeys” is a single group, that is, mules (c.f. Clark 2000: 173 n. 466) and if the “γοναί of bulls” are oxen, then the referent for the noun phrases is specific in both cases, and this structure both reinforces and reflects the interpretation of the genitives urged above. Mules, like oxen, serve as hard-working yoke animals and, again like oxen, they are incapable of reproducing themselves. In specifying mules and oxen, the author of the fragment has identified two familiar groups of work animals, whose servile *and* procreative condition, as both Plutarch and Porphyry readily appreciated,<sup>38</sup> literally embodies the most conspicuous example of animals that live *only* to work in the interest of humankind. Moreover, ordinary working mules and oxen are the products of human intervention and the intricacies of animal husbandry, which is, in turn, a suitably

<sup>38</sup>Cf. Porph. *Abst.* 3.22.7. The sterility of mules was a familiar phenomenon, and it also intrigued Aristotle because cross-breeding resulted in the whole γένος being sterile, not simply individuals within it (*GA* 747a23–25).

Promethean τέχνη that explains these animals' presence in *Pr.* 462–65, to which this fragment alludes.<sup>39</sup>

Clarity motivates the need to mark the unusual dual parentage of mules when, as here, a generic word like ὄχειον, as opposed to ἡμίονος or ὄρεύς, applies to them. Just as ὄχειον “stallion” could apply to stallion animals other than horses (for example, jackasses or cocks), so too ὄχειον “offspring” ought to be applicable to any animal that was produced by ὄχεία “mounting.” But to judge by resonance, ὄχειον “offspring” by itself might have conveyed the sense of “mule,” if not universally, at least with some regularity. Note the resonance when Pindar (fr. 106 M) distinguishes the ὄχημα or “mule-car” from the ἄρμα or horse-drawn “war-chariot.” If ὄχειον denotes “offspring,” and the phrase ἵππων ὄνων τ' ὄχεία means “mules,” then the passage from *Prometheus Bound* and the fragment with which we started are, in fact, parallel in both structure and thought. The deliberate breeding of mules, like the castration of bulls, always requires special care and human intervention,<sup>40</sup> a fact that informs the author's chosen locution in this fragment, which now, in Nauck's and Mette's version, and in its own dramatic context, may be rendered more prosaically as Prometheus benefiting human beings by

bestowing mules and oxen  
as slaves that inherit [their] labors. (Fr. 194 N; fr. 336 M)

## VI. Conclusion

Even without Porphyry, the inherent difficulties alone make it likely that Aeschylus' ὄχεία should not mean “stallions”—or *coitus* or “wagons,” for that matter—and, so far as I can tell, neither Porphyry nor Plutarch took it in any of those senses. Instead, they recognized a genuine Early Classical definition of the neuter substantive ὄχειον, which is otherwise unattested but conforms to a familiar linguistic pattern, and *LSJ* requires correction. Aristotle's use of the feminine

<sup>39</sup>Conacher 50–51 is puzzled: “As for the first selection, that of adapting animals to man's use (462–6), I know of no particular reason why this should be given prominence.” Horses are harder to explain in this connection, but their status as adornments of wealth (i.e., a byproduct of other Promethean τέχναι) and the fact that, in Attica, horse-breeding, as opposed to horse-keeping, was a specialized technical operation are justification enough. Griffith 1983: 171 was defensive about horse-training as being Poseidon's province, not Prometheus', but horse-training is not per se the issue.

<sup>40</sup>The limited availability of horses mandated a certain amount of human management, and Hellenic animal husbandry devoted considerable attention to the practice of breeding mules (cf. Isager and Skynsgaard 87). Needless to say, oxen are not produced in nature either.

noun ὀχεῖα “mounting, mating” as a synonym for ὄχευμα “embryo” (above, n. 6) should be noted by *LSJ*. More to the point, Aeschylus’s ὀχεῖα is a technical application of the neuter substantive ὀχεῖον, denoting the “offspring,” typically but not exclusively mules, of an ὀχεῖα “mounting, mating.” In this sense, ὀχεῖον is a specialized usage connected to the adjective ὀχεῖος, -α, -ον, which is now seen to mean not only “kept for breeding (mounting)” (*LSJ*) but also “derived from breeding (mounting).” In practice, this meaning might also be reinforced by analogical uses of the adjectival suffix -εῖος, -α, -ον to convey the idea of descent (cf. Καδμεῖος, -α, -ον; Τυνδάρειος, -α, -ον). Moreover, this meaning of ὀχεῖα as “offspring” also demonstrates that Nauck and Mette preserve the correct reading of the fragment:<sup>41</sup>

ἵππων ὄνων τ’ ὀχεῖα καὶ ταύρων γονάς  
 δοῦς ἀντίδουλα καὶ πόνων ἐκδέκτορα. (Fr. 194 N; fr. 336 M)

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<sup>41</sup>It is always a pleasure to thank friends for their advice and assistance. Thomas Worthen commented on points of presentation. Alan Nussbaum exceeded the bounds of φιλία; without his generosity and shared expertise, the linguistic part of this argument would not have achieved its present form.

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